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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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27 MARCH 1974


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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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27 MARCH 1974
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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW LOOKS FOR NEW IMPETUS TO DETENTE IN KISSINGER VISIT

Secretary of State Kissinger's arrival in Moscow on 24 March provided Moscow an opportunity to demonstrate anew its persistently bullish posture on relations with the United States and to call for new measures to restore momentum to the process of improving relations. Kissinger's visit provided a focus for revival of some of the more glowing language about U.S.-Soviet cooperation as the basis for world peace that was so prominent in Moscow in the wake of the Washington summit last June. Typical of such treatment was a widely broadcast 23 March Yevgeniy Makarov commentary that spoke of the "new atmosphere" in U.S.-Soviet relations as a result of a turn to "realism" in U.S. policy. Makarov cited Brezhnev's remark last summer that the two countries' economic and military might and international influence "burden them with special responsibility for the fate of universal peace and for prevention of war."

As has become typical for Kissinger's visits, Soviet media have been positive but brief in their coverage, in contrast to the extensive coverage given to visits by the two countries' top leaders. Moscow's reporting of the 25 March luncheon remarks by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Kissinger and of other aspects of the visit underlined the businesslike and optimistic attitude with which both sides were entering the talks.

Moscow's reaction to recent setbacks to U.S.-Soviet detente and adverse developments within the United States in regard to some of its economic and strategic goals has been to underline the need to restore momentum to the process of improving relations. As Podgornyy put it in early March, in welcoming new U.S. Ambassador Stoessel to Moscow, "the important thing now is not to relax efforts to further promote Soviet-American relations." In the context of the Kissinger visit, Makarov made the same point in his 23 March commentary: "Further progress in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States is even more important today, because the opponents of detente are stepping up their efforts."

The same posture has been evident in the strategic relationship. Moscow, after briefly registering its concern about statements by Defense Secretary Schlesinger on missile targeting since

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January, has resumed its customary public reticence on the strategic aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, with the exception of its traditional expressions of concern about the size of the U.S. military budget. TASS and Moscow radio reports of Kissinger's 21 March press conference in Washington ignored the more cautious aspects of his remarks on SALT, as reported in the Western press, while stressing his indications of progress. As Moscow reported in a 22 March broadcast to Great Britain, the Secretary "said that an agreement was within sight."

That Moscow would find evidence of progress in East-West arms limitation negotiations particularly timely now was implied by Valentin Zakharov, who observed in a 26 March commentary: "Every new barrier which can be raised against these anti-peace forces as a result of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations and the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of troops and arms would be a plus for the cause of consolidating peace."

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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

MOSCOW CONTINUES TO PLUG FOR STRONGER MIDEAST ROLE

On the eve of Secretary Kissinger's arrival in Moscow on the 24th, Soviet comment has placed renewed emphasis on the shared interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in detente. But minimal comment on the Arab-Israeli situation has continued to stress that Moscow expects to take a more prominent part in further Mideast peace moves. Thus TASS on the 21st, reporting Kissinger's press conference that day, noted his remark that the United States proceeded on the assumption that a Mideast settlement would be impossible without the agreement of the Soviet Union, and that the United States would strive to cooperate with the USSR "wherever possible." A Losev commentary broadcast to North America the following day seemed to underscore the Secretary's remark, saying that "everyone now recognizes" that a Middle East settlement "cannot be attained without the Soviet Union, much less against its interests."

As if to underscore its role as an active participant in Middle East affairs, Moscow announced on the 26th, as Kissinger continued his talks in the Soviet Union, that Syrian President al-Asad would pay an official visit to the USSR in the first part of April--presumably to consult on the forthcoming negotiations over disengagement on the Golan front. And Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was reported as winding up a "cordial official" three-day visit to Iraq on the 26th. Soviet visitors to the Middle East were also reported as cultivating contacts with various Palestinian groups.

In the meantime, Moscow has continued to show concern over indications of Western leanings in Egypt's economic and foreign policies. Comment warning of imperialist and reactionary influences in Egypt has moved up the scale of authority from Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts to Moscow radio broadcasts in Arabic and now to PRAVDA. On the 25th PRAVDA published a TASS dispatch from Beirut reporting an appeal to the Egyptian president from Lebanese public figures demanding an end to Cairo press attacks against Nasir and his policies.

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SYRIA Setting the stage for President al-Asad's forthcoming visit to Moscow, Soviet media continue to reiterate that an agreement on disengagement can only be accepted if it is regarded as a first step toward total withdrawal. The comment points to Israeli "military provocations" and "threats" to Damascus as evidence that Tel Aviv has no intention of accepting an overall settlement. A commentary in Arabic on the 26th, stressing the importance of al-Asad's visit, urged the Arabs and their friends to be wary in the light of Israel's reluctance to return any captured Syrian territory.

A less one-sided view was presented in the Losev commentary broadcast to North America on the 22d. Professing some optimism about prospects for a settlement, it pointed to difficulties likely to arise concerning the Golan Heights. Judging from Israeli press reports, Losev said, Israel would resist any demand for return of the town of al-Qunaytirah in the first stage of disengagement--the first Soviet intimation that this is one of Syria's negotiating demands. Losev indicated that U.S. policy would be likely to decide the issue. Israel's future course, he said, "will naturally depend in large measure" on what Washington does. He noted that the Arabs still retained some leverage to affect U.S. policy through their planned reexamination of the oil embargo issue in June.

IRAQ Other than the communique released on the 26th, neither Moscow nor Baghdad has revealed any details of Defense Minister Grechko's 23-26 March visit to Iraq.* The communique noted that a "comprehensive discussion" on cooperation in military and other fields was held and that the sides expressed satisfaction with their military cooperation. The two parties were also reported as satisfied with the development of their "friendly" relations in line with the Soviet-Iraqi treaty.

The passage on the Middle East, identical with that contained in the communique issued after Saddam Husayn's 25-27 February talks in Moscow, merely affirmed that peace in the region could be established only through the liberation of all occupied Arab territories and the securing of the national rights of the Palestinians. (After Saddam Husayn's Moscow visit, the Baghdad paper ATH-THAWRAH on 1 March praised Soviet-Iraqi relations "despite disagreement or inconsistency in viewpoints on certain matters.")

* Grechko last visited Iraq 14-17 December 1971.

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The communique obliquely indicated that Grechko's talks also dealt with problems arising out of the Iraqi Government's 11 March announcement of autonomy for Kurdistan as well as with Iraqi-Iranian relations. During the visit, it said, Grechko was apprised of the "progressive social, political and economic achievements taking place in Iraq in a manner that serves the people's interest, the strengthening of national unity, and the safeguarding of the country's territorial security and sovereignty." This passage appeared in Baghdad radio's "text" of the communique but was absent from the available Moscow versions.

Baghdad radio announced on the 26th that Soviet Internal Affairs Minister Shchelokov would head a delegation to Iraq on the 28th for a four-day official visit at the invitation of his Iraqi counterpart. Soviet media have not as yet reported the visit.

CONTACTS WITH MOSCOW has continued to furbish its image
PALESTINIANS as a friend of the Palestinians since
Gromyko's talks with Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat in Cairo and Damascus
early in March. While no date has been announced for 'Arafat's
"official" visit to the USSR, said by Arab media to have
been proposed by Gromyko, several contacts between Soviet
middle-level officials and Palestinian representatives have
been publicized by Moscow.

IZVESTIYA on the 21st, for example, carried a dispatch from correspondent Koryavin in Beirut reporting his meeting with eight Palestinians deported from the West Bank last December.* The dispatch reported that the eight represented a new "patriotic political organization," the Palestine National Front, established in January in response to Israeli policies in the occupied territories. IZVESTIYA described the front as uniting the "broadest circles of the population" in the occupied territories. It said the front regarded the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians and denied that the Palestinians in the occupied territories

* Apart from TRUD and PRAVDA analyses late last spring of the Lebanese-Palestinian clashes, the last major central press articles on the Palestinians appeared in PRAVDA in August 1972 and in SOVIET RUSSIA in October that year. The weekly NEW TIMES has also occasionally carried articles on the Palestinian movement.

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followed a "different path" from those outside the West Bank and Gaza. A generally consistent picture of the front had been given by Cairo's AL-AHRAM in January. The Lebanese Communist Party daily AN-NIDA' on 8 March had also described a similar organization, formed with communist participation, but had dated its founding as last August.

Another meeting reported in the central press concerned the visit of a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to Kuwait in late February. According to an interview with the delegation leader published in IZVESTIYA on 19 March, the group had a talk with members of the PLO office in Kuwait and leaders of unions of Palestinian journalists, engineers, and lawyers.

Meetings between Soviet ambassadors in Mideast countries and Palestinian representatives have also been reported. IZVESTIYA chief editor Tolkunov, visiting Beirut in mid-March as part of a Mideast tour, was reported by the Lebanese CP organ AN-NIDA' on 15 March as having reviewed "Middle East and Palestinian issues" with Fatah central committee members in a Soviet embassy meeting attended by Soviet Ambassador Azimov. Such meetings involving Azimov have been reported before in Arab media, but seldom by Moscow.

The Soviet ambassador to Jordan was also reported to be active. The Syrian news agency on 6 March reported him as having outlined the USSR's concept of Palestinian "rights" in an Amman lecture the day before. While the ambassador's lecture was not reported at the time by Soviet media, a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 23d---apparently referring to the same lecture---quoted him as saying the USSR considered that "the first phase" in obtaining Palestinian rights should be liberation of the Arab lands occupied in 1967, "so as to give the Palestinians the opportunity to return to their lands, to get compensation and self-determination." The broadcast also cited the ambassador as saying that Israel should officially recognize the Palestinians' national rights. The Syrian news agency, but not the Moscow broadcast, additionally reported that the ambassador had declared that a just solution, from the Soviet point of view, "does not begin with the destruction of Israel but in finding basic points to be agreed on."

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Apart from reporting the ambassador's remarks, the Moscow commentary on the 23d was at pains to build up the PLO's image of respectability and legitimacy. It pointed out that "patriotic forces" of the Palestinian movement deplored terrorism, and it cited 'Arafat as saying that 103 countries had recognized the PLO as the legitimate sole representative of the Palestinian people. While asserting that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries supported the PLO, it stopped short of indicating that the Soviet Union regarded the PLO as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people.

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FORCE REDUCTIONS

SOVIET BLOC MEDIA HINT PROGRESS POSSIBLE IN UNOFFICIAL TALKS

Despite the publicly avowed adherence to the rule of secrecy to which both sides have agreed in the MBFR talks, the Soviets and East Europeans have occasionally resorted to press leaks and other manipulative tactics to influence public understanding of the course of the talks and of Soviet positions on the issues. The most notable example was the disclosure of the three-phase Soviet proposal in November, which was made known to the press in Vienna within days of its formal presentation. Two additional cases have occurred in recent weeks: one a planted story suggesting that good progress was being made in the "unofficial" talks that have recently been organized to facilitate the formal negotiations; the other an apparently indiscreet remark by a Soviet commentator suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union could resolve their differences on a "bilateral basis." Both seem calculated to raise public expectations concerning the possibility of progress in the talks; they may have been timed to take advantage of Secretary Kissinger's anticipated visit to the USSR, then just three weeks away.

INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS The first item was an unsigned article, obviously based on a Warsaw Pact leak, which appeared in the 1 March Vienna paper WIENER ZEITUNG. Citing a "well-informed source," the article noted that the NATO and Warsaw Pact negotiators had agreed to conduct informal explorations outside the plenary MBFR meetings. The article pointed out that there was a "good and businesslike" atmosphere at the talks, and that a "new phase" of progress was promised by the inauguration of the unofficial multilateral meetings. More importantly, it implied that NATO had agreed to discuss the basic points of the Soviet November proposal, which called for an across-the-board reduction of nuclear armed forces, air forces, and national as well as foreign forces.

Moscow has refrained from commenting directly on the substance of the WIENER ZEITUNG article, limiting its publicity to a singular verbatim citation of almost the entire article in an 8 March PRAVDA commentary by I. Melnikov. The East Europeans have been less reticent. Since the beginning of the informal meetings in February, Czech, East German, and Polish commentators have strongly implied that the West is now ready to discuss the contentious issues of the Soviet proposal, albeit in the unofficial talks. The most direct assertion of this line appeared in the

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Polish army daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on 14 March. Reporting from Vienna, PAP correspondent A. Rayzacher wrote that the informal meetings were being "used also to discuss the reduction of national armed forces and armaments, air forces, and nuclear forces." The East Europeans have not gone so far, however, as to suggest that NATO has acquiesced in a formal discussion of the Soviet demands.

Meanwhile, the maverick Romanians have gone public to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the unofficial meetings, which in Bucharest's view would restrict its ability to participate fully in Vienna. According to AGERPRES, the Romanian delegate at the 21 March plenary meeting charged that efforts to "elude the official framework of the conference" and to discuss "basic issues" in "unofficial forums" do not "contribute" to the smooth functioning of the conference. Ceausescu personally aired this view in a 23 March Vienna DIE PRESSE interview, asserting that it is now "difficult" for the public to evaluate the progress at Vienna because of "certain conditions . . . and trends in the framework of these talks."

U.S.-USSR "BILATERAL"
WITHDRAWALS

The second item was a Moscow commentary on 1 March which broached for the first time the possibility of a "bilateral" reduction of forces in Europe by Washington and Moscow. The remark came in a Moscow radio broadcast of the regular German-language feature "military-political commentary" by Valentin Zakharov. Posing the rhetorical question of why the West European governments even bothered to send their delegations to Vienna if they were not interested in reducing their forces, Zakharov remarked:

After all, a mutual reduction of troops of the United States and of the Soviet Union stationed in central Europe can certainly be decided on a bilateral basis, as evidenced by the development of the Soviet-American relationship.

This unprecedented statement by a Soviet commentator seems unlikely to have been made without careful calculation. That it appears to give substance to West European concerns about a Soviet-American condominium--concerns which Moscow has been at pains to dispel in other contexts--only tends to reinforce this conclusion. The likeliest explanation is that it was intended to stimulate suspicions in the Western camp concerning the purposes of Secretary Kissinger's then projected visit to the USSR.

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U.S. ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENTS

Moscow has all but ignored the recent statements on the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe made by President Nixon in Chicago and Houston on the 15th and 19th respectively, by Secretary Kissinger at his press conference on the 21st, and by Vice President Ford in his exclusive REUTER interview of the 22d.* Thus Moscow has avoided speculating on the possibility of a unilateral U.S. withdrawal of forces from Europe if the United States and the West European states cannot compose their various differences. Moscow has also avoided self-initiated comment on the West European reaction to the President's remarks, reaction which has included speculation on the possibility of a Washington-Moscow bilateral move to reduce forces outside the context of the MBFR negotiations.

* For a review of Moscow comment on the President's recent statements see the TRENDS for 20 March 1974, pages 7-8.

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INDOCHINA

PRG OFFERS "NEW" SIX-POINT PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH

The content and presentation of a "new" six-point plan for implementation of the Paris agreement, set forth in a 22 March PRG statement, suggest that the proposal constitutes a new propaganda platform, rather than a genuine effort to end the fighting in Vietnam and the deadlock in the PRG-GVN negotiations. The proposal contains much harsher criticism of the Saigon government than did two similar PRG plans--promulgated on 25 April and 28 June 1973--and it was released in the form of a government statement, rather than in a report on its presentation at the bilateral consultations with the GVN in Paris as in the case of the earlier proposals.*

While extolled in accompanying propaganda as a "great overture" and a "very important contribution" toward achieving a settlement, the latest proposal for the most part recapitulates the programs contained in the two earlier six-point PRG proposals. It omits some of the concrete suggestions for implementation made last June, but adds a new element with the suggestion of a specific interval in which elections in South Vietnam should take place.

The PRG appeared to give renewed attention to the negotiations with the GVN by announcing on the 23d that its chief delegate to the talks, Nguyen Van Hieu, recently had left Vietnam to return to Paris. (Hieu left Paris on 10 January, and is said to have been reporting to the PRG and its Advisory Council on the status of negotiations.)

+ The 22 March proposal's first point, calling for an immediate ceasefire, advocates that both sides issue government appeals and military orders calling for a cease-fire, that these appeals and orders be disseminated by the media of both sides, that the ICCS be informed of the cease-fire agreement and be given assistance to supervise it, and that the participants in the international conference on Vietnam also be informed. The earlier PRG six-point plans had not included such a scenario, instead urging the implementation of the cease-fires already called for in the Paris agreement and the 13 June joint communique.

* These earlier PRG six-point proposals are discussed in the TRENDS of 2 May 1973, pages 11-13, and 5 July 1973, pages 7-11.

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The current PRG statement does not raise several specific proposals for implementing the cease-fire that were contained in the April and June 1973 six-point initiatives. Thus, it does not call for the pullback of military forces to positions held before the 28 January 1973 signing of the peace agreement, urge the rapid delineation of respective zones of control, or specify that commanders of opposing units should meet to reach agreement on measures to avert further conflict. It is not clear why these demands were dropped; they had been voiced officially as recently as 17 January, in a statement by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman commenting on a GVN cease-fire proposal.

+ The second of the current PRG points, dealing with the disposition of civilian and military prisoners, adds some new elements to previous PRG proposals. Whereas the April and June proposals dealt only with civilian prisoners held since before the peace agreement was signed, the current six points cover military as well as civilian prisoners and include those "captured and detained since 28 January 1973." All these prisoners, it maintains, should be returned "within three months, by 30 June at the latest."

In line with the generally harsher tone of the current proposal, the second point does not simply reiterate calls for humane treatment of prisoners pending their return but instead demands that Saigon "immediately stop inhumanely torturing, killing, or mistreating the detainees" and that it "improve its extremely cruel prison system." It repeats earlier proposals that national Red Cross societies inspect the prisons.

The April and June six-point plans had made no reference to the number of prisoners allegedly held by Saigon. However, the current PRG statement charges that the GVN is detaining more than 200,000 civilian and 15,000 military personnel captured before 28 January 1973. The figure of 200,000 civilians has been used repeatedly by the communists, but the claim that Saigon has kept 15,000 military prisoners has rarely been made until recent months. The figure of 15,000 military prisoners was used in an LPA commentary last August and appeared this year, for example, in the PRG Foreign Ministry "document" on the implementation of the peace agreement, issued on 22 January, and in a 14 March PRG Foreign Ministry statement on the prisoner question.

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+ The third point of the new proposal briefly reiterates the demands in the six points of June and April for guarantees of "democratic liberties." However, the fourth point--on the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord--departs considerably from the content of last June's PRG initiative. The June proposal had stipulated in detail the formation, structure, and functions of the National Council, suggesting that it be given virtually the powers of a coalition government, with authority over all contending parties. The current plan merely notes that the third force must be given a proper position in the Council and cites the Council's tasks as specified in Article 12 (B) of the Paris agreement. It proposed that the Council be formed within three months after a cease-fire; last June the PRG urged that the Council be formed within a month.

While the PRG's retreat from its more specific demands on the Council's functioning could be viewed as a conciliatory move, the less precise content of the current proposal may simply reflect the PRG's estimate that there is no likelihood of detailed negotiations in the near future on the formation of the Council.

+ In the fifth point, addressed to the question of general elections, the PRG for the first time suggests that elections be held within one year after formation of the National Council. Earlier, vaguer proposals had simply called for holding elections as soon as possible after implementation of the cease-fire and guaranteeing of liberties, and the PRG has resisted Saigon efforts to fix a date for elections. The PRG statement reiterates the communist position, stated in the previous six-point proposals, that the elections would choose a constituent assembly that would draft a constitution and set up an official government.

+ The PRG statement's sixth point deals with the question of disposition of the Vietnamese armed forces in much the same manner as did earlier PRG plans. This point repeats the content of Article 13 of the peace agreement, which stipulated that the two sides should settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in the South and that their discussions would include such questions as measures to reduce military effectives and demobilize the troops being reduced. Consistent with communist opposition to Saigon efforts to accelerate implementation of this article--which is intended to resolve the problem of the North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam--the PRG statement suggests no deadline for completing the military reduction.

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REACTION TO PRG STATEMENT Hanoi responded to the PRG statement with a 23 March DRV Government statement asserting that the new proposal would open the way for progress at the PRG-GVN talks and insure the scrupulous implementation of the Paris agreement. The DRV statement demanded that Saigon respond seriously to the "very constructive" proposal and that the United States end its involvement in Vietnam and "be responsible for making the Saigon administration scrupulously implement all provisions of the Paris agreement." Other North Vietnamese comment included a NHAN DAN editorial on the 23d which claimed that the PRG proposal contained "many new and practical points based on the developments that have taken place in South Vietnam over the past year and in response to the pressing demands of the people of various strata."

PEKING, MOSCOW RESPONSES Reflecting its usual restraint on Vietnam developments, Peking backed the PRG and DRV government statements with a bland 26 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--the lowest level of authoritative PRC comment. While voicing support for the PRG's six points, the article focused its mild criticism on the Saigon regime and gave only tangential treatment to the United States. Peking notably failed to repeat its usual specific demand that Washington adhere to the Paris agreement, employing this time a vague formula specifying merely that the agreement's provisions must be thoroughly implemented. NCNA earlier replayed versions of the PRG and DRV statements that omitted harsh criticism of the Nixon Administration.

Moscow promptly summarized the PRG's six-point proposal in a TASS report on the 24d. A 24 March TASS review of the Soviet central press noted that "much scope" was given the PRG's "new initiative" and that PRAVDA had commented that the proposal paved the way for "genuine peace." The six points were also endorsed in a 25 March TASS commentary assailing alleged Saigon violations of the Paris accord.

HANOI MEDIA DENY DRV MIGHT ACCEPT U.S. CONDITIONS FOR AID

Hanoi has responded angrily and with apparent sensitivity to news reports suggesting that North Vietnam has been considering accepting Washington's conditions for U.S. postwar aid to the North. The issue was raised first in a 24 March Hanoi radio commentary in Vietnamese, reacting to a 10-day-old news item, and subsequently discussed along similar lines in a commentary published in NHAN DAN on 27 March. Such attacks on reports suggesting a DRV-U.S. deal on the aid question

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have appeared only occasionally in Hanoi media during the past year, although propaganda regularly complains of U.S. failure to abide by its "obligation" to aid the North. Hanoi last indicted U.S. aid policies in detail in a DRV Foreign Ministry "document" released in January which reviewed the work of the U.S.-DRV Joint Economic Commission, claiming that it had decided in June on the details of an aid program but that the United States imposed "political conditions" to avoid signing an agreement.*

The 24 March radio commentary was pegged to a 14 March report from a REUTER Paris correspondent which, according to Hanoi, cited U.S. officials as stating that "North Vietnam had manifested its desire to receive \$1 billion in aid from the United States in exchange for a promise not to initiate or support major military offensives in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." The radio also quoted REUTER as stating that the U.S. officials maintained that "this is why" Hanoi recently returned the remains of 23 U.S. pilots and has referred to the possibility of normalizing relations with the United States.

Denouncing the U.S. officials' statements as a "fabricated story," the radio accused the United States of trying to deceive the public, cover up "the fact that the United States and the Saigon administration are seriously violating the Paris agreement," and evade "the U.S.-Thieu clique's responsibility for causing the present tense situation in South Vietnam and Indochina." The commentary maintained that the United States has an "obligation" to contribute to "healing the wounds of war" in North Vietnam, and claimed that Washington had "pledged that this contribution will be unconditional." The radio also assailed the United States for setting "one condition after another" for resumption of meetings by the joint U.S.-DRV economic commission.

The 27 March NHAN DAN article similarly outlined U.S. responsibilities and pledges. It commented with regard to the news report that "the Nixon Administration has shown its very bad intent in releasing odious fabrications against the DRV" through U.S. officials.

BACKGROUND Late last summer Hanoi responded officially to U.S. statements on conditions for U.S. aid. Thus, for example, an 11 September 1973 DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denounced "U.S. authorities" for declaring that the United

* The DRV "document," first publicized on 17 January, is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 16-18.

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States would not fulfill its obligation to aid the DRV so long as Hanoi did not properly implement Article 8 (B) of the Paris agreement, which calls for cooperation in obtaining information and returning the remains of personnel listed as missing in action.

On 6 August a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman scored remarks by a U.S. State Department spokesman three days earlier that the United States would provide no reconstruction assistance to the DRV until Hanoi fully observed the cease-fire in Indochina and Congress appropriated the money. Responding even more explicitly, a 5 August NHAN DAN commentary had denounced the United States for linking the stalemate in the joint economic talks with the situation in Cambodia and declared that Washington "may not pose preconditions" for assistance or link it to "the situation elsewhere."

SIHANOUK'S FRONT OBSERVES FOURTH ANNIVERSARY IN SOMBER MOOD

Faced with the current Cambodian military stalemate, Prince Sihanouk's Front this year marked the fourth anniversary of the Front and its insurgent army in a markedly more somber atmosphere possibly reflecting a realization that their struggle may be protracted. The insurgents' main backers in Hanoi and Peking have further reduced their public support in treating this year's anniversary, while Moscow media gave it increased attention compared with 1973. The Front's sober propaganda for this year's anniversary contrasts with the optimism of late 1973 that the current dry season offensive would gain a decisive victory, suggesting that Front policies may be under review in the light of the military stalemate. Possibly related to this was the 24 March announcement that RGNU Defense Minister Khieu Samphan would make his first publicized visit outside Cambodia since the Front was formed in 1970. Khieu Samphan will pay an official visit to the DRV "in the near future," according to a DRV Foreign Ministry communique broadcast by Hanoi on the 24th.

Hosting a 23 March anniversary banquet in Canton attended by PRC provincial leaders, Sihanouk struck a sober note in assessing the present situation, according to NCNA's report of the conclave. Observing that the Front is struggling not only against Lon Nol but also the United States--"the biggest imperialism in the world"--the prince warned that there may be "protracted" struggle that "will continue for several more years." NCNA's brief rendition of Sihanouk's remarks also disclosed that he remained firm on the settlement question, promising Front resolve to persevere in fighting without compromise or retreat until complete liberation.

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RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth's 23 March appeal on the anniversary similarly blamed U.S. support to Phnom Penh in explaining the Front's failure to topple Lon Nol. He took special note of the "large amount" and "various types" of U.S. assistance, which he said allowed the "clique of traitors" "to survive this agonizing situation for the time being." The appeal's rationale had been employed three days earlier by an RGNU Propaganda and Information Ministry statement which focused on alleged intensified U.S. aid to Phnom Penh "since the beginning of the current dry season."

Penn Nouth also harshly denounced alleged U.S. maneuvers urging unspecified third countries to pressure the Front to reconcile with Lon Nol. Sustaining a firm settlement stance, Nouth affirmed that "we resolutely oppose all arrangements and reconciliation with the traitorous clique" and assailed "the U.S.-style peace, which is a fake peace." He affirmed that a settlement must conform to the Front's five points.

PEKING, HANOI
SUPPORT

Peking's coverage of the anniversary generally conformed with its low key commemoration last year, when Sihanouk was also absent from the capital. However, this year for the first time the usual PRC leaders' message was not carried by NCNA. The message, addressed by Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth, has thus far been monitored only in Peking radio's French service to South-east Asia and Peking's Cambodian service--both obviously focused on the Indochinese audience. Tung and Chou duly hailed the Front's "people's war" under the leadership of "head of state" Sihanouk and promised to be the Front's "powerful support" and to "strongly back" the struggle until total victory. The message mentioned the insurgents' striving for achievement of the five points, but avoided any direct PRC endorsement of the Front settlement position.

Reflecting Peking's altered assessment of the Cambodian situation and the U.S. role there in the wake of last August's U.S. bombing halt, the companion PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, unlike last year's anniversary editorial, did not focus on "U.S. intervention and aggression" as the "key" element to the persisting Cambodian problem. A 23 March Peking reception attended by the RGNU foreign minister produced a Chinese leadership turnout at a level similar to last year, but it was addressed by the RGNU ambassador and a Chinese vice foreign minister, in contrast to 1973, when the PRC and RGNU foreign ministers spoke.

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North Vietnamese coverage of the anniversary, while publicizing the usual leaders' message, NHAN DAN editorial, and RGNU ambassador's reception in Hanoi, was noticeably more low key than last year. The leaders' message and brief reports on remarks by Le Thanh Nghi at the ambassador's reception were much less effusive than last year, omitting promises to stand in the "same trench" with the Front against the United States, references to the Front's "unprecedented victories of strategic significance," and the promise to "assist" the insurgents. Only the NHAN DAN editorial specifically reaffirmed Hanoi's promise of assistance while offering a generalized pledge of support.

Hanoi duly backed the five points and hailed Sihanouk as "head of state," but it failed to repeat last year's characterization of the prince as the "representative of the legality, legitimacy, and the continuity of the Cambodian state." However, Hanoi comment did routinely identify the RGNU as the "sole, legal and genuine government of the Cambodian people," and attack the chief Phnom Penh leaders by name.

MOSCOW TREATMENT Reflecting its movement toward closer relations with Sihanouk's government over the past year, Moscow gave increased attention to the anniversary. In contrast to 1973, when the anniversary drew only a PRAVDA article, this year Moscow publicized a Podgornyy message to Sihanouk, a signed article in IZVESTIYA on the 21st, a 22 March TASS commentary, and a 22 March report of a Moscow public meeting in support of the Front. Podgornyy's message noted that the Soviet people have invariably aided with the Cambodian "patriots" and expressed confidence that relations between the two peoples "will continue to develop." IZVESTIYA pledged that the Soviet people "have always supported and continue to support the Khmer patriots' struggle for freedom and independence," while the TASS commentary duly noted Front achievements under the leadership of "head of state" Sihanouk.

LAO CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST PARTY LETTER MARKS 19TH ANNIVERSARY

For at least the last three years a Pathet Lao point-to-point radio-teletype circuit has carried a letter from the secretary general of the clandestine Lao communist party, the Lao People's Party (LPP), marking the anniversary of the party's founding. Each year the transmission carried instructions that the letter be broadcast on the Pathet Lao radio's dictation-speed program. This year's letter was monitored from the point-to-point radioteletype circuit on 21 March

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and from the dictation-speed voicecast in two installments on the 22d and 23d. The Pathet Lao radio did not repeat the letter on its other programs, however, and in fact there is no previous monitored reference to the LPP or its members in Pathet Lao media meant for general dissemination.* The secretary general of the LPP is Kayson Phomvihan but when he is mentioned in the media he is identified in his role of vice chairman of the Lao Patriotic Front rather than in his party post.** As in the last two years, the anniversary letter was signed by LPP Secretary General "Viengsay"--a pseudonym Kayson Phomvihan is known to use.

SUBSTANCE OF
LETTER

The letter endorsed the political settlement in Laos over the past year, expressing support for the creation of a provisional coalition government.

At the same time it used more militant rhetoric than LPP statements, and called attention to continuing revolutionary tasks. Thus, it held that past victories would provide "a firm base for the expansion of our revolution in peacetime" and described the "liberated zone" as a "strong fortress for the revolution" and an "independent state." Elsewhere it advocated encouraging "the people's struggle movements" in areas under the control of the Royal Lao Government as one action necessary to preserve peace and achieve the national democratic revolution. In addition to routinely denouncing "the U.S. imperialists," the letter went beyond the usual Pathet Lao line to warn that there remains a "possibility of the resumption of the war in our country by the U.S. imperialists and their hirelings."

While duly praising the "heightened" prestige of the LPP, the letter echoed earlier anniversary messages in hailing the LPP as the organizer and guide of "every achievement of the Lao revolution." It claimed that the Lao party has "excellent relations" with other communist parties and expressed thanks for the assistance of "all fraternal parties, the Vietnam Workers Party in particular."

* Presumably, the letter was aired on the dictation speed radio program the past two years, but FBIS did not cover those programs. However, the TRENDS of 28 March 1973, pages 12-13, presents a discussion of the anniversary letter and background information on the Lao communist party.

** For example, reports of Kayson Phomvihan meetings during the past year with North Vietnam party chief and East European communist leaders visiting Sam Neua identified him as Lao Patriotic Front vice chairman.

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MOSCOW REPORTS PHAM VAN DONG STOPOVER EN ROUTE TO CUBA

The three-day stopover in Moscow of a DRV delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong provided an occasion for the Soviet leadership to reaffirm its solidarity with the DRV-PRG stand on the "full and precise realization" of the Paris accords. Moscow media generally have given low-key attention to the situation in Vietnam since the last high-level Vietnamese visit, when PRG leader Nguyen Huu Tho led a delegation to the USSR last December.* In the intervening period the anniversary of the signing of the Paris agreement, on 27 January, and a DRV note on the anniversary of the act of the international conference on Vietnam, in early March, have prompted commentaries in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA routinely condemning alleged violations of the peace accord. More recently, a RED STAR article on 20 March denounced alleged Saigon violations and U.S. military aid to the GVN, specifically citing reports on the U.S. delivery of F-5E jets.

During their 19-21 March stay in Moscow, Pham Van Dong and DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh held "friendly and cordial" talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin and reportedly examined questions of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. PRAVDA's report on the 20 March talks quotes Kosygin as declaring Soviet support to the DRV-PRG efforts for implementation of the Paris accords on "a just settlement of the internal political problems" of South Vietnam--suggesting the talks, coming two days before the release of the latest six-point PRG proposal, dealt in part with the search for a settlement in South Vietnam. According to PRAVDA, Dong also informed the Soviet premier about the decisions adopted by the VWP Central Committee's 22d plenum and the work of the fourth session of the DRV National Assembly with regard to DRV economic rehabilitation.

The PRAVDA report on the talks appeared to deliberately obscure whether the Soviet side went on record with even a mild condemnation of U.S. attitudes. After quoting remarks by Dong--and before citing Kosygin's views--the paper observed that "it was emphasized" that an abnormal situation with serious complications persists in South Vietnam as a result of Saigon actions "backed by imperialist circles in the United States." A 23 March Moscow domestic service broadcast identified both Kosygin and Dong with this allusion to "circles" in the United States; however, VNA's report on the talks only quoted Dong as criticizing the United States.

* Soviet statements at the time of the Nguyen Huu Tho visit are discussed in the TRENDS of 4 January 1974, pages 4-6, and 19 December 1973, pages 15-16.

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K O R E A

DPRK PROPOSES DIRECT PEACE TALKS WITH UNITED STATES

A North Korean announcement on 25 March that Pyongyang was ready to enter direct talks with the United States on a peace agreement to replace the "outdated" 1953 Korean armistice agreement appears to stem in part from DPRK dissatisfaction with its sporadic negotiations with Seoul. The proposal also seems to be a tactical maneuver aimed at regaining the propaganda initiative seized by Seoul on 18 January, when it called for a North-South nonaggression pact. The proposal for U.S.-DPRK negotiations was announced by Foreign Minister Ho Tam at a 25 March session of the Supreme People's Assembly.

The substance of the Pyongyang proposals suggests they were made largely for propaganda advantage: the DPRK offer is predicated on the elimination of U.S. military and political influence in South Korea, demanding a virtual capitulation of U.S. positions in the ROK as a precondition for a North Korean "pledge"--with no provisions for enforcement--that it would not attack the United States nor expand its military capabilities. Under Pyongyang's proposal, the United States would be committed to withdraw all U.S. troops from South Korea "at the earliest possible date along with all their weapons" and to agree not to interfere "in any form" in the internal affairs of Korea. The proposal recommends the appointment of delegates at "a rank higher than those of the Korean Military Armistice Commission" to attend talks at Panmunjom or in a third country.

Pyongyang has made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the North-South Korea talks over the past year, but there is no indication in the new proposal that these stalemated talks would be interrupted in favor of U.S.-DPRK negotiations. The fifth session of the current series of North-South meetings of the Coordination Committee's vice chairmen was held on 27 March and another is scheduled for 24 April. Ho Tam's reference to the talks sounded a pessimistic note regarding the level of antagonism between the two sides, warning that "the dialog between the North and South has come to the verge of rupture and the situation is moving to division, not reunification, and to war, not peace."

Thus far there has been little communist comment on the DPRK proposal, though NCNA has transmitted extensive excerpts of the SPA letter and pertinent excerpts from Ho Tam's report. TASS has

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carried three brief dispatches on the letter, and a TASS review of IZVESTIYA for 27 March noted that a Yuriy Shtykanov article hailed the "new, major initiative" as being in the interest of peace. A PAP report of a DZIENNIK LUDOWY commentary expressed hope that U.S. officials would examine the SPA document "without emotions or prejudices."

BACKGROUND For the past 17 years official North Korean efforts to prompt a U.S. withdrawal have centered on the conclusion of a peace agreement with South Korea. In September 1957 North Korean president and party leader Kim Il-song proposed that an agreement be signed and the armed forces of the two sides "be reduced drastically after all foreign troops are withdrawn from our country." In a more specific offer, the North Korean Government announced in June 1970 that after a U.S. withdrawal the two sides could conclude an agreement and reduce the size of their armed forces to 100,000 or less. Two years later Pyongyang modified its position, asserting that an agreement could precede withdrawal. In a report to the SPA session in April 1973, Premier Kim Il proposed the conclusion of a peace agreement that would guarantee among other things the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. As a further inducement, a letter sent to all foreign governments and parliaments by the SPA at the same time announced that "if the U.S. forces pull out of South Korea, we are willing to reduce our army strength to 200,000 or less of our own accord."

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CHINA

PROVINCIAL MEDIA LINK LIN PIAO TO "IMPERIALIST ATROCITIES"

During the past month several PRC provincial radios have broadcast lurid accounts of past imperialist atrocities committed in China, in each case using a local atrocity story to point out that Lin Piao was colluding with Soviet social-imperialism to drag China back to an era when such incidents were possible. The broadcasts appear to be aimed at bolstering enthusiasm for the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign by suggesting the horrors that would have befallen the Chinese people had Lin and his followers not been ousted. The stories evidently are based on local legends or events, and thus the Japanese--who were probably most guilty of atrocities--have been most frequently mentioned in local accounts. However, the examples do not appear aimed at harming Peking's relations with Japan or western nations formerly active in China. The silence of Peking central media on the subject, at a time when provincial radios are responding on a fairly wide scale, suggests that while Peking approves the campaign, it recognizes the sensitivity of the issue and wishes to limit the campaign to less authoritative media.

Alleged U.S. involvement in atrocities has thus far been limited to tangential references in two provincial broadcasts--Kweichow on 2 March and Szechwan on 12 March--which denounced local concentration camps run during the war years by "U.S.-Chiang special agents." The Yunnan provincial radio on 22 March carried the most inflammatory atrocity account, which concerned a camp where Chinese children were used in medical experiments, tortured, boiled in oil and even eaten, but the broadcast did not try to identify a particular villain, instead blaming "imperialists" in general. The broadcast credited "our savior Chairman Mao and the communist party" with changing these conditions and giving the survivors "a second life."

Japanese war atrocities were featured in several recent broadcasts reviving memories of past imperial transgressions in China. Typically, a 21 March Foochow report recalled Japanese war crimes to illustrate that Lin Piao was a "traitor" and a "deadly enemy" who wanted to return to the conditions of "old China" and let imperialists "fire their guns at us once again." The broadcast only referred to "Japanese militarism" in a historical context and avoided forecasting a revival of militarism in present-day Japan, as had been done routinely before Peking-Tokyo relations were normalized in 1972.

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Judging by a recent PEOPLE'S DAILY article, broadcast by Radio Peking on 23 March, the provincial accounts of Japanese atrocity stories are not meant to signal any change in the status of Sino-Japanese relations today. The article attacked "Seirankai," a rightist group within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, for "openly clamoring for a revival of Japanese militarism," but it was careful to reflect Peking's continuing regard for its special relationship with Japan. After noting that the war launched by Japanese militarists in 1937 "is still clearly remembered by the Chinese people," the article characterized Prime Minister Tanaka's 1972 Peking visit normalizing relations as part of the general trend toward friendship between the Chinese and Japanese people, a trend "nobody can hold back."

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NOTES

PRC AND REVOLUTION: Chou En-lai's renewed pledge of PRC support for world revolutionary struggles--in a 24 March speech at a Peking banquet for Tanzanian President Nyerere--was the first such reaffirmation since Chou's report to the 10th CCP Congress, in which he pledged that Peking would uphold "proletarian internationalism" and strengthen unity with the "proletariat and the oppressed people and nations of the whole world." Such broad vows of Peking support have become rare since Peking began strengthening ties with the West, but have appeared from time to time as the occasion warranted. Most notably, only one month after President Nixon's February 1972 visit to China, Chou declared in no uncertain terms at a banquet for Cambodian Prince Sihanouk that China would continue to support the struggles of the Indochinese, Arabs, Third World and "all the oppressed nations and peoples." Chou cited the authority of Mao's teachings to affirm that "the Chinese people have always regarded it as their bounden internationalist duty to support the revolutionary struggle of the people of all countries," and added that Peking will stand forever with oppressed peoples and nations throughout the world and "together with them wage a joint struggle."

CEAUSESCU ON WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE: Against the background of recent public endorsements by the leaders of Moscow's five orthodox East European allies favoring preparations for a new Moscow-sponsored world conference of communist parties, Romania's Ceausescu has now gone on record as favoring international conferences "in principle." He hedged his endorsement with so many caveats, however, that it amounts to not much more than damning the idea with faint praise. In an interview published in the Vienna DIE PRESSE on 23 March and summarized by AGERPRES, Ceausescu asserted that an international meeting must be in the interests of each party and must "in no way impair the autonomy and independence" of any party. He added that any conference must allow "a free exchange of opinions" which would "in no way" lead to a discussion of another party's policies. Alluding to some of the difficulties at the 1969 Moscow conference, Ceausescu declared that if any conference adopted a joint document, "it must be prepared with the consent of everyone; under no circumstances, however, can it become obligatory for anyone." His remarks follow the recent article by RCP Secretary Burtica in the first March issue of the party's theoretical journal, ERA SOCIALISTA, which set forth in unequivocal terms Bucharest's independent views on how multilateral party conferences should be conducted.

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SOVIET ARMS IN PERU: The first known Moscow acknowledgement that Soviet military equipment has been supplied to Peru appeared in a Moscow commentary, broadcast in Portuguese and Spanish to Latin America on 22 and 23 March. Denying foreign press claims that Soviet military bases were being established in Peru, the commentary went on to note that Peruvian President Velasco Alvarado had conceded under questioning at a 13 March press conference that the Soviet Union had supplied Peru with arms. It quoted the president as saying that "the Peruvian Government had no intention of concealing its purchases of Soviet arms," and that Peru had been "forced to take this step because of the arms race started by neighbors." The commentary added that this was a defensive measure prompted by Chile's purchase of arms from the United States, West Europe, and Israel. Although Moscow is generally reluctant to publicize Soviet arms deliveries to other countries, the current departure is apparently aimed at reinforcing the image of Moscow's support for the Peruvian military government. The commentary indicated that the current campaign against Peru is being waged by "forces" seeking to discredit Peru's "progressive regime" and halt the socio-economic changes which have occurred in that country.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18 - 24 MARCH 1974

Moscow (2826 Items)

Indochina	(1%)	9%
[Pham Van Dong in USSR	(--)	4%]
[4th Anniversary of Cambodian Front	(--)	3%]
China	(5%)	6%
Chile	(2%)	5%
Brezhnev Alma-Ata Speech	(7%)	4%
Norwegian Premier Bratelli in USSR	(--)	4%
Arab-Israeli Issue	(3%)	3%
AAPSO Meeting, Baghdad	(--)	3%

Peking (1005 Items)

Cambodia	(1%)	13%
[Sihanouk in Laos and DRV	(1%)	5%]
[4th Anniversary of Cambodian Front	(--)	4%]
Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius	(12%)	8%
PRC/Guinea-Bissau Diplomatic Relations	(--)	7%
USSR	(2%)	3%
[PRC Foreign Ministry Note	(--)	2%]
Protesting Helicopter Intrusion		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.